

## COMPELLING CHINA: THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF COERCION

BY

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**COMPELLING CHINA:  
THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF COERCION**

by

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## **ABSTRACT**

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## COMPELLING CHINA: THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF COERCION

[E]ach act of coercion ...feeds into the set of assumptions and anticipations about the behavior of others which conditions all power plays in international politics. This is why the study of coercion cannot be considered to be simply about the design of efficient threats. It must also consider the way that strategic actors construct reality and in particular their grasp of how their opponents construct reality.<sup>1</sup>

—Lawrence Freedman  
Strategic Coercion

Preventing a future political-military crisis with China may be among America's greatest foreign policy challenges. History provides plenty of cause for concern for U.S. policy makers. Historically, the expanding influence and interests of a rising power often provoke strategic competition, crises, and even military conflict with established powers.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, scholars have already characterized the current U.S. – China relationship as one of “constrained competition.” Although both sides recognize the need to cooperate on limited diplomatic and economic issues of mutual interest, the two nations regard each other with profound strategic mistrust.<sup>3</sup> Events of 2010 confirmed this characterization. Tensions increased as the two powers wrangled over volatile security issues involving the South China Sea, North Korea's provocative behavior, and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Moreover, both nations continued to pursue advanced military capabilities to hedge against possible future confrontation. These trends fuel an already growing suspicion over each other's intentions. Under these circumstances, U.S. policy makers and military strategists are rightly concerned that, as China's power and influence grows, so does the risk of a serious political-military confrontation or crisis between the two powers.

Despite the increased risk of crisis, U.S. – China competition remains constrained by the mutual recognition that the potential costs of a direct military confrontation makes war between the two nuclear powers an exceedingly dangerous and unacceptable option. Therefore, if crisis prevention fails and a serious political-military crisis with China erupts, U.S. decision makers and military strategists must craft a comprehensive crisis response strategy that prevents unwanted escalation and avoids direct military confrontation, yet is forceful enough to persuade or coerce China to back down and resolve the dispute on terms favorable to the United States. .

Crafting an effective strategy to compel an adversary to back down in a crisis is an exceedingly difficult task. Decision makers and planners must synchronize the proper combination of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of U.S. national power to persuade and/or coerce China. Persuasion relies on influencing the adversary through reasoning or coaxing – primarily soft power, while coercion relies on the use of force, hard power, to make an adversary yield or comply. A strategy that emphasizes persuasive soft power lowers the risk of conflict but may fail to achieve America's crisis objectives. Alternatively, a strategy that relies on the military instrument and *coercive force* to punish or physically compel China to back down may be decisive, but obviously increases the risk of war. A potentially less costly strategy involves using the *threat* of coercive force in an attempt to intimidate China, convincing Beijing that the costs for not backing down are simply too high to continue its provocative behavior and compelling Beijing to yield or comply. While still inherently risky, strategies that rely on coercive threats provide an attractive alternative to coercive

force because they provide decision makers with greater flexibility at potentially less cost.<sup>4</sup>

Using the threat of force to compel an adversary to change its behavior is as old as the dawn of warfare. Thucydides records how the Athenians in the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C. threatened to destroy the Melians unless they complied with Athenian demands. Faced with an overwhelmingly superior military force, the Melians had every reason to believe the Athenian threat was credible. The Athenians had every reason to believe that the weaker Melians, faced with a credible threat of destruction, would weigh the costs of defiance and make the rational choice to yield and save their people. Yet, in the end, the Athenian attempt at coercive diplomacy failed and the Melians refused to yield. The Athenians felt compelled to make good on their threat, annihilating the Melians but paying a heavy price themselves in both lives and treasure.<sup>5</sup> The question is, given the credibility of the Athenian threat, why did the Melians refuse to yield? Why did coercive diplomacy fail and was there a less costly alternative?

The answers to these questions deserve more than a cursory academic discussion. Twenty-four-hundred years later, U.S. decision makers and military planners may face the exact same questions in a political-military crisis with China. Will coercive strategies be effective in averting war with China or will they propel the two powers into armed conflict? How can policy makers and strategists assess the utility of a coercive strategy? What does history say about the use of coercion and are there analytical tools for decision makers that can provide insight into Chinese strategic reasoning in a crisis situation?

Too often, U.S. decision makers and strategists focus their attention on the debate over how to prevent a crisis caused by a rising China. Decision makers spend much less time contemplating what happens after a crisis occurs, i.e. assessing and preparing effective whole-of-government response strategies. More often than not, the U.S. government passes crisis planning responsibility to the military. Recognizing the potential costs of failure if a crisis should escalate to armed conflict, it is imperative that decision makers not only have a firm understanding of the theory of coercion but also the analytical tools to adapt the model to the specific context of a crisis with China. This study seeks to address this shortfall by assessing the utility and challenges of using coercion, specifically coercive diplomacy, as part of a strategy to compel China to change its behavior in a crisis situation. The paper is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the theory and practice of coercion and coercive diplomacy during crisis management and demonstrates how the analytical tool of strategic culture may be useful in adapting the theoretical models to a specific crisis context. Part II provides an analysis of China's strategic culture as it relates to coercive diplomacy and crisis management, and Part III addresses strategic policy implications for the United States and offers recommendations for revising U.S. strategy toward China.

#### Part I: Deterrence, Coercion, and Crisis Management: Theory and Application

A crisis arises when there is a conflict over core or vital interests between actors where neither side is initially willing to back down.<sup>6</sup> An actor may precipitate a crisis through deliberate actions to challenge the status quo, or through unintentional actions that give rise to either a real or perceived threat that requires an opponent's counter-action.<sup>7</sup> A full-blown political-military crisis is normally accompanied by a significant

threat of military conflict and is often bounded by a time element or sense of urgency.<sup>8</sup> That is, there is a perception that the threatened party must respond, either through words or deeds, to prevent the crisis from escalating beyond control and inflicting unacceptable costs. In a deliberate crisis, the initiator's actions may be well planned and choreographed. An unintentional crisis may catch the actors unprepared to respond appropriately or force them to adapt already existing contingency plans. Regardless of intent, actors in all crises suffer from a degree of uncertainty stemming from an asymmetry of information concerning the adversary's perceptions and intentions and further complicated by the shortage of time to gather and process needed information.

To reduce the uncertainty and risk of escalation, actors engage in what is essentially a time-bound crisis bargaining process.<sup>9</sup> Rather than resort to the costly use of brute force to hammer an opponent into accepting a solution, both sides, either consciously or unconsciously, use a "bargaining" process that seeks a solution that may be less than their preferred outcome, but better than the alternative of war.<sup>10</sup> Crisis management literature outlines three basic components of crisis bargaining where DIME elements of power are applied: persuasion (including assurance), accommodation, and coercion.<sup>11</sup> In crisis bargaining, decision makers "must decide what combination of persuasion, coercion, and accommodation [options] to employ and in what sequence."<sup>12</sup>

Before going further, it is important to draw an analytical distinction between the components of bargaining mentioned above. Although coercion is fundamentally designed to "persuade" an adversary to change his behavior, the literature makes a

distinction between *persuasive* actions and *coercive* actions. Persuasive actions employ essentially soft power-related DIME actions to reassure and accommodate an adversary's needs. Coercive options rely more on hard power to either punish or threaten an adversary with some type of cost for continued non-compliance – either diplomatic (such as international isolation), economic (e.g. sanctions), or military (the threat or limited use of force). *Webster's Unabridged Dictionary* defines coercion as “the exercise of force to obtain compliance,” and it includes the concepts of coercive force, deterrence, and compellence. As discussed above, the United States can apply coercive military force to impose unacceptable physical and psychological costs on an adversary to compel it to stop its unwanted behavior. The goal of coercive force is to destroy an adversary's capability or will to resist and force him to accept the coercer's demands. War by its very nature is a form of coercive force. Deterrence and compellence, on the other hand, rely on the credible *threat* of force rather than the actual *application* of brute force. These strategies threaten to impose unacceptable costs and deny the adversary any potential benefits of his actions.<sup>13</sup> Deterrence and compellence rely on creating a “state of mind” within the adversary – a perception or belief that ultimately influences his strategic reasoning and decision making calculus.<sup>14</sup> For deterrence and compellence to succeed, the coercer must create the perception of choice for the adversary – a choice that emphasizes that restraint or backing down is more favorable than continuing the undesired action.<sup>15</sup>

There is an important analytical distinction between *deterrence* and the concept of *compellence* that U.S. joint military doctrine does not address. Deterrence uses implicit or explicit threats to prevent or dissuade the adversary from taking an unwanted

action.<sup>16</sup> Compellence, as developed by Thomas Schelling, involves using coercive threats to make an adversary stop, change, or reverse an unwanted action *that he has already taken*.<sup>17</sup> In other words, deterrence threatens punishment *if* he chooses to “cross the line.” Compellence utilizes the threat of punishment to force him to back down after he has already crossed the line.<sup>18</sup> In international relations literature, scholars often refer to the use of coercive threats to compel an adversary to stop or reverse an unwanted action as coercive diplomacy.<sup>19</sup> Because it incorporates the threat of military force, coercive diplomacy is distinct from other non-military coercive attempts such as economic sanctions. However, as the term implies, coercive diplomacy is a more flexible strategy that may incorporate other DIME elements of national power (such as economic sanctions) as an alternative to coercive force.<sup>20</sup>

The 1999 Kosovo case illustrates the analytical distinction between crisis bargaining components. NATO’s threat to bomb Serbia to *prevent* President Slobodan Milosevic from attempting ethnic cleansing in Kosovo was an example of deterrence. Once deterrence failed and Milosevic began the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, NATO’s threat to bomb Serbia to *compel* Milosevic to *stop* the ethnic cleansing and remove his forces was an example of coercive diplomacy. After Milosevic ignored the threat of force and continued with the ethnic cleansing, NATO began the air campaign over Serbia and engaged in coercive force, punishing him for not complying and attempting to compel him to yield by destroying his nation’s self-defense capability and its will to resist. In the Kosovo case, the NATO coalition, much like the Athenians, was unable to compel Milosevic and his advisors to comply. They failed to create the perception – the state of mind – that the choice of compliance was more favorable than

continued resistance, at least until coercive force, along with other DIME levers, were employed.

### *Elements of Coercive Diplomacy*

Coercive diplomacy is not a military strategy. It is an alternative to a military strategy that incorporates military action as part of a larger political-diplomatic strategy that may include other DIME elements.<sup>21</sup> The political scientist Alexander George was among the first scholars to explain how to convert the model of coercive diplomacy into the basis of a crisis strategy. Building on the work of Thomas Schelling, George outlines four interrelated tasks for decision makers as they adapt a coercive diplomacy strategy to a specific crisis.<sup>22</sup> First, decision makers must develop the general framework of the coercive strategy. They must decide exactly what they want to achieve by using coercive diplomacy. This may be the most challenging aspect of developing the strategy because the crisis objectives will drive what the coercer will demand and what he intends to threaten in order to compel the adversary to yield or comply. According to Schelling, for coercive diplomacy to work, there must also be a time limit for the demand to be met – a sense of urgency – or the threat of punishment becomes meaningless. Decision makers must decide how to create this sense of urgency. The last part of developing the basic strategy outline involves deciding whether to offer positive inducements to help persuade the adversary to accept the demands. The concept of inducements often runs counter to the goals of coercive threats, yet researchers have linked positive inducements to success in historical case studies.<sup>23</sup>



The initial coercive framework then in turn influences the next task: crafting the right combination and sequence of the persuasion/coercive effort. George's research identified several coercive diplomacy approaches that he categorized as: 1) deliver a time-bound ultimatum or tacit ultimatum, 2) employ a step-by-step "try and see" approach, or 3) a gradual escalation approach, gradually increasing the pressure until the opponent yields.<sup>24</sup> From a strategist's perspective, this is perhaps the most critical task because it requires decision makers to integrate all the DIME instruments of national power into a comprehensive whole-of-government approach that is both flexible and dynamic.

George's next task requires strategists to factor in the contextual variables for the specific crisis. The context of each crisis situation is unique to that specific crisis and George emphasizes that coercive diplomacy is a highly context-dependent strategy.<sup>25</sup> Among the important contextual variables that George identifies are the global strategic environment, how each side perceives what provoked the crisis, and how each side perceives what George calls the "image of war." George describes it as how the two opponents perceive the costs and consequences if the crisis should escalate to war.<sup>26</sup>

The final task necessary to craft a coercive diplomacy strategy is one that is particularly important for U.S. decision makers and military planners. George explains that the basic model of coercive diplomacy is built around the assumption of an entirely "rational" opponent.<sup>27</sup> That is, it assumes that the adversary has complete knowledge to perform a cost-benefit analysis that arrives at an optimal decision for his own self-interest. The problem is that, during a real crisis, decision makers rarely have complete knowledge regarding the situation, their opponent, or their opponent's strategy.

Furthermore, there are a number of external variables that influence the decision making process that the decision maker is either unaware of or misinterprets. Absent adequate intelligence of the adversary, military planners tend to mirror image their own biases and rational calculations. Most military planners will automatically assume a rational adversary because it provides a level of predictability and certainty in their crisis planning process. George warns, however, that for coercive diplomacy to succeed, decision makers and military planners must understand how an adversary “approaches the task of rational calculation.”<sup>28</sup> Decision makers need access to analytical tools that will expand their knowledge and allow them to replace a purely “rational” opponent with a more realistic model. George explains it best when he writes:

“...policy makers making use of a strategy of coercive diplomacy must replace the assumption of pure rationality with sensitivity to the psychological, cultural, and political variables that may influence the adversary’s behavior when he is subjected to one or another variant of the strategy.”<sup>29</sup>

The preceding review of the coercive diplomacy model points to a recurring strategic theme: crafting an effective coercive diplomacy strategy requires more than a rational calculation of costs versus benefits. The coercer must understand how the opponent thinks – his beliefs, perceptions, and assumptions about the crisis, his adversary, and the interests at stake.

### *Challenges to Interpreting Coercive Diplomacy*

One of the primary challenges to employing coercive diplomacy is that it is rarely a one-sided, asymmetrical strategy. The preceding Kosovo case illustrates that the adversary is likely to engage simultaneously in counter-coercion techniques or coercive strategies of its own.<sup>30</sup> Milosevic gambled that if he could embroil Russia in the political conflict, it might have created enough political-diplomatic turmoil and pressure on NATO

to end the bombing campaign and buy him time to complete operations in Kosovo.<sup>31</sup> As the coercing actor develops his coercive diplomacy strategy, the adversary will likely try to deter or counter with a meaningful strategy to nullify the coercive attempt. If the target has reason to believe the counter-coercion has potential to succeed, it increases his motivation and resolve to resist the coercer's demands.<sup>32</sup>

However, the preceding Kosovo example should not lead one to assume that deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and coercive force fall along a continuum of distinct phases of crisis response - i.e. starting with deterrence, shifting to coercive diplomacy once deterrence fails, and then resorting to coercive force if that fails. Deterrence and coercive diplomacy are not mutually exclusive and are often employed in concert. The challenge for policy makers on both sides is understanding exactly what actions to prevent, stop, or reverse and, more importantly, defining when an adversary has actually taken (or chosen not to take) those actions that will trigger the threatened response. In the case of Kosovo, the triggering action seemed quite clear: Milosevic had begun ethnic cleansing. In other cases, defining exactly what actions trigger a threatened response may be more difficult to discern and subject to interpretation, especially when both sides of a crisis are engaged in deterrent, coercive, and counter-coercive techniques. As Robert Art points out, a challenger may perceive a deterrent act as a compellent act (i.e. a defensive action as an offensive action), requiring a counter-coercive response. For example, in a political-military crisis, the President and Secretary of Defense may call on the Combatant Commander to develop flexible deterrent options (FDOs) to communicate the strength of U.S. commitment and resolve. However, FDOs have two basic purposes: first, to prevent the crisis from escalating to

armed conflict by rapidly improving the balance of U.S. military power (thereby communicating American resolve). The second purpose is to pre-position U.S. forces in a “manner that facilitates implementation of OPLANS [operational plans] or OPORDS [operational orders].”<sup>33</sup> The question is, at what point are such measures as the repositioning of strategic bombers, intelligence assets, or theater missile defense systems considered prudent deterrent measures and, knowing the secondary purpose of U.S. doctrine, when are they acts of coercion requiring a counter-coercive response? The answer depends very much on the context of the situation, but more importantly on how each side perceives the other’s intentions. The initial intent may be to deter a challenger from intervening: “Do not cross this line, or else.” However, the opposing side can easily interpret the repositioning of forces as a coercive step to stop or reverse perceived legitimate actions: “Get back behind the line, or else.” Again, the success of coercion, and coercive diplomacy, depends very much on how the two sides perceive each other’s intentions and motivations. It is the interrelationship between perceptions and intentions that makes coercive diplomacy such a confounding strategy for decision makers.

### *The Strategic Paradox of Coercive Diplomacy*

American decision makers and military planners may be strongly tempted to pursue a coercive diplomacy strategy in a crisis with China. Given America’s current military superiority, military analysts may perceive that China, like the Athenians perceived the Melians, will be inclined to quickly back down in the face of overwhelming military capability, thereby avoiding armed conflict. Indeed, like the Athenians, the United States perceives itself as particularly adept at the use of coercive force to

compel an adversary to yield, either through physical or psychological defeat.

America's military superiority and global presence provides the basis for the credible deterrent for potential challengers. However, as discussed previously, deterrence and compellence are two very different strategic means. A survey of recent U.S. history may give military planners reason to pause before choosing a coercive diplomacy strategy. Since the end of World War II, the United States' record with coercive diplomacy has been mixed. According to one study, U.S. attempts at coercive diplomacy failed in 68% of the cases.<sup>34</sup> As it turns out, the United States, much like the Athenians, is far less adept at using the *threat* of violence in a comprehensive coercive diplomacy strategy to persuade an adversary to yield.

It is impossible to point to any one reason why coercive diplomacy so often fails to achieve the desired effect. Each historical case succeeded or failed not because of any single cause, but the confluence of several factors unique to the context of that situation. However, international relations literature highlights some useful insights for U.S. decision makers and strategists.<sup>35</sup> First, as the Athenians discovered (and modern day scholars have since verified), the balance of relative military power between the coercer and his adversary is not a decisive determining variable.<sup>36</sup> Alexander George found that, while superior military capability is critical to projecting credible intentions, the strength of each side's motivation to resist, or more appropriately the perception of motivation and intentions, appears to be more important.<sup>37</sup> Motivation refers to the relative importance of the interests at stake and the costs or risks associated with abandoning those interests. Intention refers to the willingness of the coercing power to escalate the crisis and impose unacceptable costs. Specifically, coercive diplomacy

worked when the opponent perceived the coercing actor was more motivated to achieve its crisis objective than he was, and was willing to quickly escalate the crisis and impose unacceptable costs, creating an asymmetry of motivation.<sup>38</sup> Lacking complete knowledge regarding the adversary's strategic reasoning, decision makers will often misperceive their opponent's intentions, increasing the risk of miscalculation and the likelihood of war.

Exploring the relationship between perceptions and intentions leads one to the inherent strategic paradox of coercion: communicating a credible *threat* of force in order to avoid *using* force. If an adversary perceives that the coercer's motivation to avoid war is stronger than his motivation to achieve his objectives and is bluffing, the threat of force is meaningless and the adversary will call the bluff. At that point, the coercer either has to resort to force and escalate, or back down. If the coercer backs down, he may lose prestige and bargaining power and thus feel compelled to follow through on the threat. For coercion to succeed, the adversary must believe the threat is credible. That means that the coercer must be willing to follow through on his threat and risk war. Ironically, the coercer might find himself in a situation where he must go to war just to prove the credibility of his intentions to avoid war. When decision makers choose to use coercion, they accept the potential contradiction of their strategic objectives and they accept the possibility of stumbling into an unwanted war.

Coercion then becomes more than a rational calculation of the distribution of power between adversaries or the magnitude of the coercive threat. The success of coercion relies more on how the two opponents perceive themselves, their own interests, motivations, and will to resist, and their perception of each other. This

analysis emphasizes ideational variables, i.e. variables that describe the influence of ideas and perception on outcomes rather than structural variables such as relative military strength. Ideational variables include the adversary's self image (identity), shared beliefs, values, and assumptions regarding the use of force, as well as his image of the opponent.<sup>39</sup> As Lawrence Freedman observed in the opening quote, coercion is more than merely designing effective threats of force and projecting credible intentions. Effective coercion requires an understanding of the adversary's strategic reasoning.<sup>40</sup> Effective coercion requires an understanding of how an adversary constructs his reality.<sup>41</sup>

These findings raise seven important questions about the utility of coercive diplomacy in responding to a crisis with China. 1) How do we accurately assess China's level of motivation and resolve to resist coercive diplomacy? 2) How does China perceive the threat of force (either to deter or compel) versus the use of force? 3) What is the right level of force to threaten to achieve U.S. goals? 4) How does China perceive the credibility of the threat of force by the United States within the context of the crisis? 5) What factors determine China's counter-coercion strategy? 6) How does China approach measuring the costs of the threat versus the benefits of resisting? And lastly, how do policy makers gain insight into China's strategic reasoning during a specific crisis?

Developing an empirically sound model of how China's leaders will respond to a coercive diplomacy strategy during a political-military crisis is a tremendously challenging task. There simply is not enough information on China's crisis management style available for analysts and decision makers to make accurate assessments and

predictions. However, there is a consistent theme throughout the case studies of the coercive diplomacy literature: Success depends not only on projecting motivations and intentions credibly, but also on properly understanding and influencing how the opponent perceives, reasons, and calculates the coercing power's coercive strategy. To assess the utility of coercive diplomacy and craft appropriate options, decision makers need access to analytical tools that will expand their understanding of the psychological and cultural variables that frame and shape China's understanding of the crisis context and preferences with regard to the use of force.

One such analytical tool that examines many of the ideational variables identified above is the concept of *strategic culture*. While there is no commonly accepted definition of strategic culture, experts within the U.S. Department of Defense have endorsed the following:

“a set of shared beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior, derived from common experiences and accepted narratives that shape collective identity and relationships to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security objectives.”<sup>42</sup>

There is a consistent theme throughout the preceding literature review: Deterrence and coercion are states of mind. The outcomes of these theoretical models depend as much on ideational variables, as they do on structural variables or on rational choice. Using the definition above, strategic culture as an analytical tool may provide decision makers and strategists additional insight and clarity with which to expand the model of coercive diplomacy, assess its utility, and craft appropriate crisis response options against China.

## Part II: Strategic Culture, China, and Coercion: Substituting the “Rational” Opponent



Proponents of strategic culture argue that culture, as defined above, has a role in shaping a state's behavior, determining its strategic preferences, and developing national security policies. The term strategic culture first entered the international relations lexicon in the late 1970s but the concept of linking strategic behavior to cultural influence has been around since at least Clausewitz' time, albeit under other names such as National Style or Ways of War.<sup>43</sup> Among policy makers, defense analysts and military strategists, the concept of strategic culture as an analytical tool has regained momentum, especially in light of America's experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. More importantly, Chinese scholars and policy makers often refer to a unique Chinese strategic culture that influences China's international behavior.<sup>44</sup> As one senior Chinese military thinker wrote:

“Culture is the root and foundation of strategy...Each country or nation's strategic culture cannot but bear the imprint of cultural traditions, which in a subconscious and complex way, prescribes and defines strategy making.”<sup>45</sup>

There is a considerable amount of research on China's strategic culture and its influence on China's international behavior. Iain Johnston was one of the first to take a rigorous approach to developing an empirical model to examine China's strategic culture. Johnston assessed China's strategic culture based on an extensive evaluation of China's classical military literature and cognitive mapping, an analytical tool to show the relationship between espoused values and actual behavior.<sup>46</sup> He later carried the same research design forward to the Maoist period. Johnston identified two different Chinese strategic cultures: a “Confucian-Mencian” paradigm that emphasizes “non-violent, accommodationist grand strategies” over violent defensive or offensive strategic preferences.<sup>47</sup> He also identified a second set of strategic preferences that he calls a

“parabellum” or *realpolitik* paradigm after the Roman adage: *si vis pacem, para bellum* (“If you want peace, prepare for war”). The parabellum paradigm emphasizes a preference for flexible and pragmatic offensive strategies. It reflects a tendency to perceive the strategic environment as generally dangerous toward Chinese interests, adversaries as threatening, and conflict as zero-sum.<sup>48</sup> Johnston’s research identified the parabellum *realpolitik* paradigm as the dominant operative preference in China’s strategic behavior. He summarized: “Chinese decision makers have internalized this strategic culture such that China’s strategic behavior exhibits a preference for offensive uses of force, mediated by a keen sensitivity to relative capabilities.”<sup>49</sup> Johnston draws several conclusions from his research. First, Chinese leadership has been quite prone to resort to and initiate force in foreign policy crises, especially crises involving territorial disputes, as compared with other states with a similar *realpolitik* strategic tradition. Second, that the parabellum tradition has persisted throughout Chinese history, implying that even with structural changes in the material distribution of power (e.g. an economically constrained America), China will still prefer the pragmatic use of offensive strategies.<sup>50</sup>

Allen Whiting examined China’s use of deterrence and coercion between 1950 and 1996. Whiting also invoked the concept of strategic culture but confined it within a strictly military paradigm reflected in combat operations and tactics.<sup>51</sup> Like Johnston, Whiting also found that Beijing preferred flexible responses yet had a propensity to accept undue risk in the use of force. Whiting’s analysis indicated that Beijing’s flexible risk management avoided escalation by an opponent. Whiting also suggested that Chinese stereotypes of an adversary’s strategic disposition “derived from a selective

interpretation of history, traditions, and self-image,” played an important role in shaping China’s perceptions and assumptions of its opponent’s behavior.

Building on the work of Johnston and Whiting, Andrew Scobell also examined the link between China’s strategic behavior and strategic culture. Scobell’s research also led him to conclude that there were two strategic cultures in China, both a Confucian-Mencian non-violent tradition and a *realpolitik* tradition advocating the pragmatic use of force. Unlike Johnston, however, Scobell found evidence that both of these traditions were operating and influencing Chinese strategic behavior. As Scobell writes:

“The combined effect of these beliefs and assumptions is paradoxical: while most of China’s leaders, analysts, and researchers believe profoundly that the legacy of Chinese civilization is fundamentally pacifist, they are nevertheless predisposed to deploy force when confronting crises.”<sup>52</sup>

This unique interaction of the two traditions, Scobell argues, produces a distinctive strategic culture he calls the “Chinese Cult of Defense.”<sup>53</sup> Scobell’s Cult of Defense emphasizes several key principles or recurring themes in Chinese strategic behavior and writings. The principles include the primacy of national unification, heightened threat perceptions, the concept of active defense, and a fear of chaos or loss of control. Scobell adds: “The combined effect of these principles is a predisposition by China to resort to force in a crisis, a marked tendency toward risk taking, and justifying the use of force in terms of the big picture.”<sup>54</sup> This last point provides policy makers with an important insight into Chinese strategic reasoning. Scobell argues that in their strategic cost-benefit calculation for using force, a favorable change in the geo-strategic “big picture” may be more important than “operational victory”. That is, in the Chinese strategic calculus, the cost of coercive force was worthwhile if it resulted in a favorable change in the adversary’s perceptions of Beijing

resolve even if it did not result in an operational military success.<sup>55</sup> The idea of accepting near-term costs for long-term benefits potentially reflects a completely different approach to rational cost-benefit analysis alien to U.S. strategists.

Like Whiting, Scobell also sees culture operating at multiple levels: strategic, political, civil-military, and organizational. To understand the influence of culture at one level, one must also understand how culture influences behavior at the other levels as well.<sup>56</sup> He also emphasizes that the “strategic culture image” of the adversary also plays an important role in shaping policies and influencing his own strategic behavior. China perceives American strategic culture as expansionist and hegemonic and therefore sees the United States as a long term threat to Chinese interests, specifically with regard to the unification of Taiwan.<sup>57</sup>

Political-military crisis management researchers, while avoiding the label of strategic culture, have identified similar trends and patterns in China’s use of force that reinforce the findings described above. Examining China’s use of force over the last 50 years, RAND analysts identified a recurring Chinese preference to invoke a crisis for political effect, i.e. to force an adversary to rethink his strategy and accept a new Chinese status quo, regardless of potential military costs as Scobell discussed.<sup>58</sup> They also found a strong disposition to resort to force in a crisis even though China might be at a military disadvantage. This disposition, they argue, demonstrates a recurring willingness by Chinese leaders to accept risk and a confidence in their ability to modulate the level of risk to their advantage and prevent escalation.<sup>59</sup>

Although extremely useful in providing additional context within which Chinese conduct strategic reasoning, the findings above fall short of providing the fidelity

necessary to define how Chinese go about the task of rational calculation in a crisis that George believes necessary for developing a comprehensive coercive diplomacy strategy. To begin to assess the utility of coercive diplomacy, strategic culture analysis must translate how shared beliefs, values, and assumptions influence Chinese leaders' cognitive reasoning within a crisis situation. J. Philip Rogers' research into political-military crisis management is useful in making this transition from macro-level strategic culture trend analysis to particular styles of strategic reasoning and crisis management. Rogers' research identifies a series of underlying cognitive frameworks, or ideal types, that shape how decision makers interpret crisis events and inform their response, decisions, and choices. Rogers bases the ideal types according to decision makers' beliefs, perceptions, and assumptions regarding the bargaining process (i.e. use of force, accommodation, and persuasion); their image of the adversary and of themselves; their ability to control crisis escalation; and their ability to modulate risk in a crisis.<sup>60</sup> These ideal types describe general attitudes toward the use of force and their ability to control escalation and limit risk, ranging from *aggressive-confident* to *cautious-unsure*.<sup>61</sup> Rogers' crisis management style typology emphasizes many of the same ideational variables identified by both George and by advocates of strategic culture. Specifically, Rogers' framework begins the difficult task of identifying how decision makers may choose the combination and sequencing of actions during the crisis bargaining processes that George identified in his coercive diplomacy model.

Sinologist Michael Swaine applies Rogers' typology framework to Chinese historical crisis behavior. Swaine's research provides useful insights into how the Chinese collectively perceive their own self-image, their image of the United States as a

potential adversary, as well as their attitudes toward the use of force, escalation, and risk management. He then begins to translate the “dominant Chinese beliefs, values, and actions” that influence Chinese crisis decision making.<sup>62</sup> More importantly, Swaine’s insights help to outline the Chinese approach to strategic reasoning and expand one’s understanding of how the Chinese construct reality. China views itself as “increasingly confident yet also acutely sensitive to domestic and external challenges to its stability.”<sup>63</sup> A shared historical memory of China’s weakness and colonial victimization at the hands of Western powers creates an extreme sensitivity to threats or challenges to core interests revolving around national dignity, sovereignty, or territorial integrity. Therefore, to maintain legitimacy, Chinese ruling elites are obligated to avoid any appearance of weakness or yielding in to external pressure, especially over territorial issues. Like strategic culture advocates, Swaine believes these elements of the Chinese national psyche tend to manifest themselves in extremely strong core principles and a tendency to view confrontation in zero-sum terms. In fact, China has historically used force to deal with threats to its territorial integrity. The importance of territorial integrity runs so deep in the Chinese political psyche that ruling elites have often opted to use pre-emptive coercive force and justified it as a defensive use of offensive force. This idea of “preventive deterrence” matches Scobell’s “Cult of Defense” strategic cultural analysis.<sup>64</sup> Moreover, China has traditionally seen itself as the weaker military power among the great powers, reinforcing its image of the adversary as aggressive and threatening.

The image of the adversary plays an important role in China’s strategic reasoning. China views the United States as an aggressive, offensive-oriented,

hegemonic power that relies on economic and military power to ensure its global dominance. Chinese elites feel the United States views China's rise as a threat to its position. They believe the United States is engaged in a Cold War-style containment policy that relies on bilateral relationships with countries along China's territorial borders that are designed to constrain China's growth and limit its strategic options.<sup>65</sup>

Using Rogers' typology, Swaine suggests that Chinese leaders' crisis management type or style generally trends toward the aggressive-confident category. According to this crisis management style, the Chinese view coercive force (or the threat of force) as the most effective means to signal credibility and resolve in a crisis. As Swaine describes it, Chinese leaders generally perceive the adversary as aggressive in nature. This aggressive image of the adversary justifies their emphasis on relatively strong, coercive actions in the initial phases of a crisis. While cognizant of the need to avoid unintended escalation, Chinese leaders have historically favored significant escalations over incremental steps to signal resolve. They perceive that small steps may be interpreted as weakness and tempt others to engage in counter-coercive strategies. As Swaine writes, for decision makers that fall into this category, "the most common cause of war in a crisis is due to a failure to demonstrate resolve early and dramatically."<sup>66</sup> Furthermore, the Chinese tend to value political objectives over purely military ones, indicating a willingness to accept greater military risk as long as there is a good chance of achieving their political goals. Additionally, China's historical behavior indicates a fairly high confidence in its ability to modulate risk relative to political objectives and avoid inadvertent escalation.

Swaine is careful to avoid using the term strategic culture in his writing, acknowledging that his research cannot be used to predict national strategic behavior. His findings are only helpful in identifying general individual preferences that decision makers may fall back on during crisis situations. However, his findings are based on broad collective beliefs, values, and assumptions shared among Chinese elites that shape their preferences and their crisis behavior. While distinct from strategic culture analysis, his research into shared styles and preferences mirrors and reinforces the findings of strategic culture advocates discussed earlier.

### Part III: Analysis and Policy Implications

Alexander George's research highlighted what he thought were the most important characteristics of coercive diplomacy: a flexible and highly context-dependent strategy that depends both on *adapting* the theoretical model to the specific crisis and on the *skill* of decision makers in implementing it.<sup>67</sup> Each crisis is propelled by a unique set of external and internal structural and ideational variables that shape and influence individual and collective perceptions and decision making styles. There are not enough data to develop a sound predictive empirical model of individual or collective Chinese crisis decision making. However, decision makers and strategists can use the research into China's strategic culture and crisis management behavior to build a general framework of Chinese strategic reasoning that replaces the "rational" opponent of George's coercive diplomacy theoretical model with a more comprehensive, analytically based one. The strategic culture framework also is helpful in developing the contextual elements of George's model and adapting them to future crisis situations. Specifically, strategic culture analysis is useful for decision makers and strategists in: 1) assessing



China's resolve and strength of motivation; 2) understanding China's preferences and perceptions on the use of force; 3) understanding how China approaches cost-benefit rational calculations concerning coercion and escalation; 4) understanding how China measures and perceives U.S. credibility; and 5) understanding how China may pursue counter-coercion strategies.

As George and others have pointed out, one of the most important tasks in determining the utility of a coercive diplomacy strategy is estimating the opponent's resolve or motivation in a crisis. Compellence is based on credibly signaling the means and the resolve to carry out the coercive threat, thereby making the adversary re-calculate the benefits of the unwanted behavior. In some political-military crises, merely signaling a resolve may be enough to make an adversary question the costs and benefits of continuing the provocative action. However, as mentioned previously, the success of coercive strategies normally relies on creating the perception that the coercer's resolve is stronger than the opponent's, or creating an asymmetry of motivation previously discussed. No matter how superior the coercer's military capability, coercive diplomacy will likely fail if the opponent's resolve is equal to or greater than the coercer's resolve. In China's case, strategic cultural analysis seems to indicate that the national resolve will be highest in a crisis involving a threat to a core interest of territorial integrity or national sovereignty, such as Taiwan, Tibet, or even the South China Sea. In a political-military crisis, the United States will likely signal the strength of its resolve through the strength of its military deterrent or coercive threat. Yet, the findings herein suggest that the balance of military power may be less important in China's strategic calculus than its national resolve to resist external

pressure or lose face over a core territorial interest. Therefore, if the United States is counting on military superiority alone to communicate resolve, overcome China's will to resist, and change the rational calculation of its leadership, coercive diplomacy may fail. Furthermore, as stated earlier, China's strategic culture seems to value political outcomes over military victory. For China, the political cost, in terms of political legitimacy, of even the *perception* of Chinese capitulation to a stronger adversary is much higher than the cost of a military defeat. It may be that, given China's strategic culture, the United States will be unable to ensure an asymmetry of motivation over China. In a contest of wills, what is important is that, while America's military capability may provide an effective deterrent to precipitating a crisis, it may be much less effective in compelling China to back down once a crisis erupts. This line of thinking is counter-intuitive to military planners. Quite often, military strategists advocate that if initial deterrent options fail, then the best course of action is to ratchet up the threat of force, signaling greater resolve but also creating dangerous escalation and the possibility of war. Therefore, a coercive diplomacy strategy based on the threat of military force alone increases the risk of fulfilling the strategic paradox – going to war while attempting to avoid it.

Strategic culture analysis also provides insights into China's approach to the use of force. The Chinese have historically preferred coercive strategies over diplomatic ones, especially if there is a good chance that such strategies can advance their geopolitical interests. As several analysts have commented, China historically has sought to avoid any appearance of weakness by demonstrating and communicating strong resolve from the outset of a crisis as part of a "preventive deterrence" strategy.<sup>68</sup>

When confronted with a potential or perceived threat to a core interest, Chinese leaders have preferred to send a strong signal as their opening move in order to coerce their opponent. No matter the crisis then, Chinese leaders are likely to pursue strong counter-coercive strategies. Moreover, in a crisis with a significant threat of military escalation, taking a strong initial position may seem like a good bargaining strategy, but in military terms it often leads to a commitment trap. Inevitably, as China and the United States take actions to enhance the credibility of their threat, their bargaining positions become more and more intractable, increasing the costs of backing down.<sup>69</sup> Once China has committed to an initial position and outcome, it cannot back away without a loss of prestige or costs to its reputation. Thus, in a political-military crisis, no amount of inducements by the United States, short of completely “backing down,” may be enough to compel China to compromise and step back from its initial position. This is, of course, exactly the perception the Chinese are counting on. These perceptions lead to unwanted escalation as the two sides attempt to demonstrate ever stronger levels of resolve to obtain their crisis objectives until one party is compelled to execute its coercive threat.

China also has a significantly different approach to risk management and rational cost-benefit calculations than the United States. First, Chinese leaders have historically demonstrated a fairly high level of confidence to engage in high risk bargaining strategies and in their ability to manage risk in a crisis.<sup>70</sup> U.S. strategists may believe they can design a coercive campaign to impose unacceptable diplomatic and military costs on China through superior military capability. However, if China can create the perception that it is willing to accept a great deal of risk in achieving its political goals,

while elevating the risk to the United States, it can force the United States to rethink its coercive strategy. Second, as Scobell and Swaine noted, the Chinese willingness to subordinate military victory to achieve long-term geopolitical changes in the status quo demonstrates a completely different approach to strategic reasoning than their U.S. counterparts. For example, a Chinese defeat in a limited naval confrontation may force a long-range change to how the United States perceives China's resolve, how the U.S. public views direct conflict with China over tertiary U.S. interests, or how the United States chooses to enforce the future status quo. In such a situation, a near-term loss may provide long-term gains. This ability to invoke a crisis or accept a confrontation over distant political ends is contrary to most U.S. strategic reasoning.

Finally, China's increasingly confident self-image combines with their strategic image of the United States and their perceptions over escalation in potentially dangerous ways. Strategic culture analysis seems to indicate that China perceives its core interests as stronger than the United States interests, especially over issues of Chinese territorial integrity. As other analysts have pointed out, Chinese elites may feel that, in the final analysis, the United States does not have the motivation or resolve to risk lives and treasure over a territorial issue such as Taiwan or the South China Sea.<sup>71</sup> The Chinese may perceive that, in a political-military crisis over a core interest, China possesses the advantage of an asymmetry of motivation over the United States at the outset. Moreover, the United States may not possess the political and domestic will to escalate the crisis to war, whereas strategic cultural analysis indicates the Chinese will likely communicate the will to escalate at any cost, win or lose. This perceived asymmetry of motivation, the ability to threaten unacceptable escalation, along with

China's increasing ability to engage in effective counter-coercive strategies, complicates the ability of the United States to use coercive diplomacy effectively.

### *Policy Implications*

Much of the analysis herein may appear to be inherently obvious to the skilled and experienced decision maker or military strategist. After all, as pointed out in the preceding introduction, deterrence and coercion are as old as warfare itself, so much so that military professionals tend to accept these strategic options as straightforward and leave them unexamined. However, the dynamic relationship between deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and crisis management is worthy of continued examination by military professionals for several reasons. First, the United States government has historically abdicated its crisis management responsibilities to the military. The military not only monopolizes the use of coercive force within the government but also has a near monopoly on crisis action planning processes, education, and training compared to other inter-agency capabilities. Handing over responsibility of crafting a comprehensive DIME strategy to the "M" significantly undermines the whole-of-government approach to crisis resolution. More importantly, military professionals and strategists are raised in a particular culture that separates diplomacy from military action, often equating political success with military victory. Military action is seen as "an alternative to bargaining, not as part of the bargaining process itself."<sup>72</sup> The military scorns the idea that decision makers may use military force as an element of "extortion" vis-à-vis an adversary.<sup>73</sup> As this review has indicated, in crisis management nothing could be further from reality. Properly managing the threat of coercive force is a critical element of the bargaining

process. Finally, the military has a tendency to simplify strategy development and operational plans by applying a universal doctrinal approach, with a reliance on rational calculations and empirically based metrics to help determine courses of actions. However, an empirically based approach assumes the adversary uses a comparable rational calculation of costs and risks. Strategic culture analysis contradicts this approach to strategy development. As the coercive diplomacy literature has emphasized, each crisis situation demands a clear understanding of the specific adversary's "rational approach" and the unique crisis context, which can only be reached by a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach.

The preceding analysis leads to four conclusions and policy implications. First, any crisis with an increasingly confident China is going to be difficult to resolve, let alone resolve on terms favorable to the United States, while avoiding direct conflict. The United States is already carefully developing a long-term China strategy that signals both a strong resolve to deter aggression while simultaneously pursuing diplomatic means to persuade, accommodate, and engage China. However, the risk of a crisis escalating to direct conflict requires the United States to redouble its conflict prevention efforts in two key areas: 1) strengthening regional partnerships and alliances, and 2) clarifying existing policies to prevent miscalculation.

Strategic culture analysis indicates that a superior military capability alone may not be enough to compel China to back down in a crisis. The U.S. will need to craft a strategy that incorporates not only all the other DIME elements of power but also incorporates DIME elements of U.S. allies and regional partners. Moreover, research findings point out that coercive diplomacy strategies have a greater chance of success

when the adversary is isolated internationally.<sup>74</sup> While America is already seeking to build stronger ties with new regional partners and renewing relationships with existing allies, the United States cannot afford to wait for a crisis to erupt before establishing a strong coalition in support of regional interests. Instead, potential crisis contingency planning considerations must be an element of all DIME type regional engagements.

Additionally, existing policies toward Taiwan and the South China Sea rely on a certain level of intentional ambiguity. In these cases, the United States is counting on the fear of miscalculation regarding U.S. intentions to deter potential aggressors that seek to challenge the status quo. However, the regional status quo is rapidly changing as regional actors develop the capabilities to enforce their claims and defend their interests. The United States should consider clarifying its regional policies in order to reduce the possibility of miscalculation. For example, the United States may propose revising its Taiwan policy to announce its intent to maintain and ensure regional stability as long as Taiwan does not claim independence.

Second, coercive diplomacy remains a highly risky and difficult strategy to skillfully implement. Understanding how to compel an adversary to back down is never a simple task, but the preceding strategic culture analysis indicates that using a coercive strategy against China is perhaps even more difficult and likely to fail. Therefore, if collective, preventive deterrence fails in the region and a crisis erupts, the crisis response strategy must be crafted using all the *combined* DIME elements at the national command level in close coordination with U.S. partners and allies. The U.S. government cannot hand over responsibility of the coercive diplomacy strategy to the “M” element of national power, but must retain complete control in order to execute a

unified strategy. This implies integrating Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) crisis planning into the interagency process rather than vice versa (integrating the interagency into the GCC planning process). Determining the exact combination and sequencing of the crisis response strategy, an element of George's coercive diplomacy model, can only be accomplished at the national command level and not solely within the Department of Defense or the GCC.

Third, if a coercive diplomacy strategy is chosen, then U.S. decision makers are going to have to wrestle with the concept of inducements. Coercive diplomacy literature as well as the preceding strategic culture analysis suggests that the proper sequencing of inducements is critical for achieving success.<sup>75</sup> Yet, in the pursuit of military success, the GCC may not perceive or appropriately value the need for inducements to allow all parties to back down, since such actions could potentially signal a weakness in U.S. resolve and run counter to achieving coercive goals. While the type of inducement is likely highly context-dependent, it must be carefully integrated in the overall coercive strategy and therefore demands attention prior to a potential crisis erupting.

Finally, using strategic culture analysis to assess coercive diplomacy has identified a potentially important gap in U.S. joint military doctrine. Joint doctrine acknowledges the utility of strategic coercion by integrating the concept of deterrence in the joint operational design phase in operational planning. In the generic (and universal) six phase planning model, deterrence is a necessary part of both phase 0, "Shape", and phase I, "Deter." Phase 0 shape operations are designed to "dissuade and deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies," while phase I deter operations are aimed at deterring "undesirable adversary



actions by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force.”<sup>76</sup> Should deterrence fail, joint doctrine implies a transition to phase II, “seize initiative” through the application of joint force capabilities, emphasizing the necessity for the application of military force.<sup>77</sup> Using this operational design approach, planners and strategists tend to either confuse deterrence with compellence, or overlook the possibility of using a military threat as a means to compel an adversary short of direct military action. In a high risk, political-military stand-off with another great power, national decision makers and military strategists will have to closely integrate their DIME expertise. However, if the military has not educated its military planners in coercive diplomacy and joint military doctrine does not incorporate coercive diplomacy techniques, there is a strong potential for DIME strategies to be disjointed and unsynchronized. The military should reconsider whether or not to teach senior military strategists coercive diplomacy concepts and include such techniques in the joint doctrine operational design approach.

*Conclusion: Culture Eats Strategy Every time.*

There is an oft used, well-known yet unattributed quote: “In a conflict over culture and strategy, culture eats strategy for lunch every time.” It is often used to describe the inherent conflict and leadership challenges associated with aligning organizational cultures with business strategies. One can just as easily use the phrase to describe the conflict in aligning and executing national policies and military strategies divorced from an understanding and experience in dealing with an adversary’s strategic culture. This study argues that – just as the United States experienced difficulty in designing deterrent and coercive strategies to deal with the Soviet Union, Vietnam, most recently in Iraq, and today with extremists and terrorists across the globe – an adversary’s

*strategic* culture trumps U.S. *military* strategy every time. The United States is relying on a strategy of enduring deterrence combined with diplomatic and economic persuasion and accommodation to build a long-term mutually beneficial and cooperative relationship with China. If enduring military deterrence fails and a crisis erupts, and history suggests it will, decision makers and military strategists will have to craft a strategy to compel China to back down while avoiding a costly war. If that crisis strategy relies solely on a military response based on rational, empirical calculations of force posture and military end-states, the analysis herein suggests that it will inevitably lead to dangerous escalation, direct conflict, and possibly war. Avoiding this costly outcome requires decision makers to thoroughly understand China's strategic culture and use that knowledge to bring greater clarity and unity to America's China policy, enhance efforts to prevent misunderstanding and miscalculation between the two powers, and train and educate national security decision makers in using coercive diplomacy. Otherwise, the United States risks letting China's strategic culture eat U.S. strategy for lunch.

## Endnotes

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<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 44. Also see David M. Lampton, *Power Constrained: Sources of Mutual Strategic Suspicion in U.S.-China Relations*, *NBR Analysis June 2010* (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010), 6.

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<sup>5</sup> Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (New York, Free Press, 1996), 351-355.

<sup>6</sup> Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Crisis Management: Framework for Analysis, Tentative Observations, and Questions for the Future," in *Chinese National Security: Decision Making Under Stress*, eds. Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2005), 6-7.

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<sup>8</sup> Swaine, "Chinese Crisis Management," 6.

<sup>9</sup> George, "A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management," 23.

<sup>10</sup> Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 2008 ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 6-10.

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<sup>12</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 277.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 8-10.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operational Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010), Glossary 9.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., E-1. Also see: Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 32-34.

<sup>16</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 7.

<sup>17</sup> Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 69-73.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 7.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>21</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 10-11.

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<sup>24</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 17-18.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 270.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 272-273.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, 367-368.

<sup>31</sup> Bruce R. Nardulli et al., *Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo*, 1999 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 38-45.

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 367. Also see: George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 279-287.

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<sup>37</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 287.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Swaine, "Chinese Crisis Management," 15-22.

<sup>40</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 19-20.

<sup>41</sup> Freedman, *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, 36.

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.

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<sup>51</sup> Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950-1996, and Taiwan," *International Security*, 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 103-131.

<sup>52</sup> Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, 4.

<sup>53</sup> Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15-39.

<sup>54</sup> Andrew Scobell, "Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie?" *Strategic Insights*, IV, Issue 10 (October 2005).

<sup>55</sup> Andrew Scobell, "Is There a Chinese Way of War?" *Parameters* XXXV:1 (Spring 2005), 118.

<sup>56</sup> Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force*, 15-39.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>58</sup> Mark Burles and Abraham N. Shulsky, *Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000), Summary, x-xi.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 76-77.

<sup>60</sup> See J. Philip Rogers, "Crisis Bargaining Codes and Crisis Management," in *Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management*, ed. Alexander L. George (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 413-442.

<sup>61</sup> Rogers does not use these simplified categories to distinguish his four bargaining code “Types” A through D. They are the product of this author’s efforts to simplify and summarize Rogers’ “bargaining codes” in a meaningful manner and in a limited amount of space. For a full discussion of Rogers’ typology, see his original research cited above. Also see Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Management,” 8-14.

<sup>62</sup> Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Management,” 16.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 17-18. Also see Scobell, “Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie?”

<sup>66</sup> Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Management,” 10.

<sup>67</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 291.

<sup>68</sup> Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force*, ch 2. Also see Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Management,” 16.

<sup>69</sup> See Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 47.

<sup>70</sup> Burles and Shulsky, *Patterns in China’s Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writing*, 76-77.

<sup>71</sup> Swaine, “Chinese Crisis Management,” 17-18, 32.

<sup>72</sup> Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, 16.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 15-16.

<sup>74</sup> George and Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 284-285. Also see Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, 371-374.

<sup>75</sup> Art and Cronin, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, 397-399.

<sup>76</sup> Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operational Planning*, III-41.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., III-41-42.